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Abstract
Thought-action fusion (TAF) refers to a set of cognitive biases that are thought to play a role in the
development of obsessional phenomena. To measure these biases, R. Shafran, D. S. Thordarson, and S.
Rachman (1996; Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 10, 379–391) developed the TAF-scale. They concluded
that the TAF-scale possesses adequate psychometric qualities. The current study sought to further explore
the reliability and validity of the TAF-scale. Results indicate that the TAF-scale has good internal consist-
ency. TAF-scores correlated with self-reports of obsessional problems. Furthermore, mean scores in a mixed
sample of anxiety disordered patients were higher than those in a normal sample. However, temporal
consistency was somewhat disappointing. Also, the question remains whether TAF is specific to obsessive–
compulsive disorder or taps more pervasive biases that play a role in a variety of disorders.  2001 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Thought-action fusion (TAF) refers to a set of cognitive biases that are thought to play a
role in the development of obsessive–compulsive problems (see Rachman, 1997, 1998). More
specifically, TAF consists of two related biases. The first is the probability or likelihood bias,
that is the belief that merely thinking of a hypothetical situation (e.g., a car accident) promotes
the likelihood that this situation will actually occur. The second is the morality bias, that is the
belief that thoughts (e.g., violent fantasies) are morally equivalent to overt behaviours (e.g.,
violence). Both TAF-biases are believed to increase distress and the urge to neutralise in case of
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unwanted intrusions (Rachman, 1998; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996). While there are
more cognitive biases with potential distressing qualities (e.g., the belief that people can and
should exert complete control over their thoughts), TAF biases appear to be especially relevant
for our understanding of the aetiology of obsessive–compulsive symptoms (Emmelkamp & Aard-
ema, 1999; Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995).
There is indeed some experimental evidence for the psychopathological potential of TAF-biases.
Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris and Spaan (1999) found that successful induction of a TAF-bias in
non-clinical participants resulted in a changed evaluation of a neutral target thought. These authors
told participants in the experimental condition that any thoughts of the word ‘apple’ might result
in the administration of an electrical shock to another participant. Experimental participants were
connected to a bogus EEG that was introduced to them as an apparatus that could pick up their
thoughts. After having spent 15 min in the lab, several visual analogue scales (VASs) were com-
pleted. Results indicated that experimental participants experienced more thoughts about apples,
and, at the same time, reported more discomfort, and a stronger urge to resist the target thought
than did controls. This demonstrates that a neutral thought may acquire obsessional qualities when
participants are led to believe that their thoughts have direct, external consequences (i.e., shocks).
Similarly, Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant and Teachman (1996) recruited participants with a
TAF-bias. Instatement of an intrusion (i.e., completing a written sentence describing the wish that
a person close to the participant would soon be involved in a car accident) resulted in distress,
feelings of responsibility and guilt, and a strong urge to engage in neutralising compulsions (e.g.,
praying). In sum, these studies suggest that TAF-biases may enhance the obsession-like character
of intrusions and consequently may provoke urges to engage in neutralising compulsions.
To measure the two types of TAF-bias, Shafran et al. (1996) introduced the TAF-scale. This
self-report scale consists of seven items tapping the probability bias and 12 items tapping the
morality bias. Their studies indicated that the TAF-scale possesses adequate psychometric qual-
ities. That is, internal consistency proved to be satisfactory (as0.85), and respondents who
scored clinically high on a measure of obsessive–compulsive symptoms also had higher TAF-
scores than normal controls. As well, TAF-scores in both a clinical and a non-clinical sample
correlated with measures of obsessional problems and depressive symptoms. Shafran et al. (1996)
concluded that “TAF is a highly reliable construct” (p. 387).
The current study aimed at gathering additional information about the reliability and validity
of the TAF-scale. Apart from the psychometrics that were previously reported by Shafran et al.
(1996; i.e., factor structure, internal consistency, and correlations with self-reports of obsessional
problems and depression), we investigated its temporal stability and its association with a measure
of fantasy proneness. The latter concept refers to the tendency to become absorbed by day-
dreaming and imaginations (Wilson & Barber, 1978). Fantasy prone individuals often have great
difficulty in differentiating between actual events and imaginary events. Accordingly, it would be
informative to study the connection between fantasy proneness and TAF. Finally, in order to
further investigate the discriminant validity of the TAF-scale, TAF-scores of OCD patients were
compared to those of patients with other anxiety disorders and normal controls.
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2. Method
Undergraduate students (N=285; 227 women; mean age=18.9 years, SD=1.5, range: 17–28)
completed the Dutch version of the TAF-scale along with several other questionnaires. The TAF-
scale consists of 19 items that are answered on a 5-point scale (0=disagree strongly; 4=agree
strongly). Twelve items tap the morality bias (e.g., “If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as
bad as doing harm”), while seven items address the probability bias (e.g., “If I think of a
relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job”). Of the seven
probability-items, three have to do with negative consequences for oneself (i.e., “probability self”;
e.g., “If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill”), while four items
refer to negative consequences for others (i.e., “probability others”). This distinction is of interest
because whereas there may be a rational basis for the probability self construct (in that a belief
may actually lead to behavioural change), the probability others construct lacks such rationality.
Results of the Shafran et al. (1996) study indicate, however, that especially in a clinical sample,
discrimination between these two versions of the probability bias hardly increases the variance
accounted for in factor analysis. These authors conclude: “obsessionals may be considered to be
engaging in a second ‘fusion’, that is, the fusion of TAF-likelihood-for-self and TAF-likelihood-
for-others” (p. 387). TAF-total scores range from 0 to 76 with higher scores indicating stronger
cognitive biases.
The Maudsley obsessive–compulsive inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) consists
of 30 true/false items addressing various symptoms, namely checking (e.g., “My major problem
is repeated checking”), cleaning (e.g., “I take rather a long time to complete my washing in the
morning”), doubting (e.g., “I am more concerned than most people about honesty”), and slowness
(e.g., “I am often late because I can’t seem to get through everything on time”). MOCI-scores
range from 0 to 30 with higher scores indicating more obsessive–compulsive symptoms.
The revised Padua inventory (PI-revised; Van Oppen, Hoekstra & Emmelkamp, 1995; see also
Sanavio, 1988) is a second measure of obsessional problems. The PI-revised contains 41 items
that are answered on a 5-point scale (0=not at all; 4=very much). Like the MOCI, the PI-revised
taps various obsessive–compulsive symptoms such as checking (e.g., “I tend to keep on checking
things more often than necessary”), impulses (e.g., “When I see a train approaching I sometimes
think I could throw myself under its wheels”), precision (e.g., “I sometimes start counting objects
for no reason”), rumination (e.g., “I find it difficult to take decisions, even about unimportant
matters”), and washing (e.g., “I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money”). Total Padua-
scores range from 0 to 164 with higher scores indicating more obsessional problems. It has been
argued that the structure of the PI corresponds to a large extent with the different types of phenom-
ena seen in OCD (Van Oppen et al., 1995). Therefore, PI-scores are expected to range broadly,
making this scale very suitable for correlational analyses.
The Beck depression inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) is a widely used 21-items instrument tapping
various depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness, irritation, crying). BDI-items are scored on a 4-point
scale (0=not at all; 3=very much). Thus, higher total scores (range: 0–63) indicate higher levels
of depression.
The Creative experiences questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Muris, Schmidt, Rassin & Horse-
lenberg, 1998) is a self-report measure of fantasy-proneness. The CEQ consists of 25 true/false
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items (e.g., “I often confuse fantasies with real memories”). Total CEQ-scores range from 0 to
25, with higher scores indicating stronger fantasy-proneness.
Of the 285 undergraduate participants who completed these questionnaires, 98 filled in the
TAF-scale a second time after a 3-months interval in order to establish its test–retest stability.
The TAF-scale was furthermore completed by a clinical sample (N=71; 47 women; mean age=33.9
years, SD=10.3; range: 18–72) consisting of 30 obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD; American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) patients and 41 patients with other anxiety disorders (mainly panic
disorder, social phobia, and post traumatic stress disorder). Also, 20 non-student healthy controls
(14 women; mean age=39.2 years, SD=14.0; range: 21–64) completed the TAF-scale.
3. Results
3.1. Factor structure
Factor analysis with direct oblimin transformation was performed on the TAF-scores of the
undergraduates (N=285). Two and three-factor solutions accounted for 49 and 56% of the variance,
respectively. The two-factor solution clearly reproduced the probability and morality subscales,
with items exclusively loading on one or the other factor (all loadings were 0.40). Probability
and morality scales correlated moderately with each other (r=0.32, p0.01). The three-factor
solution reproduced the morality subscale and the two types of probability bias (one involving
negative consequences for oneself and the other involving negative consequences for others).
With this solution, one item loaded on both probability biases. The correlation between probability
self and probability others was 0.47 (p0.001).
3.2. Alphas
Table 1 summarises means and alphas for the TAF-scale, MOCI, PI, BDI, and CEQ. As can
be seen, alphas for the TAF-total scores and subscales were satisfactory (all as0.75).
3.3. Temporal stability
Three months retest correlations for the TAF-total (r=0.52), probability (r=0.51), probability
self (r=0.53), probability others (r=0.47), and morality (r=0.54) scores were all significant at the
0.01 level. However, mean TAF-scores during the second test occasion were significantly lower
than those during the first occasion. More specifically, mean total scores dropped from 20.39 to
16.41 (SD=10.63: t[97]=6.05, p0.001), probability scores decreased from 6.25 to 4.71
(SD=4.56: t[97]=5.40, p0.001), probability self scores dropped from 4.16 to 2.77 (SD=2.63:
t[97]=6.96, p0.001), while probability others scores decreased from 2.10 to 2.00 (SD=2.60:
t[97]=2.03, p0.05), and morality scores dropped from 14.21 to 11.62 (SD=7.96: t[97]=4.95,
p0.001). Intraclass correlations for the TAF-total, probability, probability self, probability others,
and morality scores were 0.68, 0.67, 0.69, 0.64, and 0.70, respectively.
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Table 1
Mean scores (standard deviations are given between parentheses) and alphas for the TAF-scale, MOCI, PI, BDI, and
CEQ (N=285)a
Means (SD) Alphas
TAF-total 20.39 (10.53) 0.88
TAF-probability 6.25 (4.55) 0.83
TAF-probability self 4.16 (2.80) 0.75
TAF-probability others 2.10 (2.50) 0.89
TAF-morality 14.21 (8.06) 0.89
MOCI-total 6.7 (4.74) 0.76
MOCI- checking 1.85 (1.75) 0.62
MOCI-cleaning 1.83 (1.66) 0.42
MOCI-doubting 1.72 (1.53) 0.55
MOCI-slowness 1.35 (1.50) 0.47
PI-total 29.35 (15.58) 0.91
PI-checking 5.94 (4.71) 0.85
PI-impulses 3.80 (3.67) 0.77
PI-precision 2.59 (2.86) 0.66
PI-rumination 12.71 (5.87) 0.82
PI-washing 4.49 (4.31) 0.81
BDI 6.19 (5.39) 0.79
CEQ 8.37 (4.21) 0.73
a Note: TAF-scale=thought-action fusion scale, MOCI=Maudsley obsessive–compulsive inventory, PI=Padua inven-
tory-revised, BDI=Beck depression inventory, CEQ=creative experiences questionnaire.
3.4. Construct validity
Correlations with the MOCI and PI-revised are given in Table 2. As can be seen, there were
significant, though modest correlations in the expected direction between TAF-total scores and
the two measures of obsessional problems (i.e., MOCI and PI). While TAF-total scores were not
associated with self-reports of depression (BDI) or fantasy proneness (CEQ), TAF-probability
scales did correlate with BDI and CEQ. But again, the correlations were modest. By and large,
the most correlations between TAF-probability scales and obsessional symptoms remained sig-
nificant when the influence of BDI and CEQ was partialled out.
To compare TAF-scores of students, normal controls, OCD patients, and patients with other
anxiety disorders, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out. Results from these
analyses are presented in Table 3. This table shows that students and normal controls scored
lower than both clinical samples. Meanwhile, there were no differences between OCD patients
and patients suffering from other anxiety disorders.
4. Discussion
The present results can be summarised as follows. To begin with, thought-action fusion as
indexed by the TAF-scale seems to consist of two separate but modestly correlated factors, with
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Table 2
Correlations between the TAF-scale and the MOCI, PI, BDI, and CEQ (N=285)a
TAF-total TAF-probability Probability self Probability others TAF-
morality
MOCI-total 0.21∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.13
MOCI-checking 0.16∗ 0.18∗ 0.17∗ 0.14 0.11
MOCI-cleaning 0.15 0.22∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.17 0.07
MOCI-doubting 0.21∗∗ 0.12 0.17∗ 0.03 0.20∗
MOCI-slowness 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.05
PI-total 0.32∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.27∗∗
PI-checking 0.26∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.22∗∗
PI-impulses 0.21∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.14 0.23∗∗ 0.17∗
PI-precision 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.10
PI-rumination 0.35∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.31∗∗
PI-washing 0.16∗ 0.17∗ 0.13 0.19 0.12
BDI 0.15 0.17∗ 0.20∗ 0.08 0.09
CEQ 0.15 0.27∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.20∗ 0.03
a Note: TAF-scale=thought-action fusion scale, MOCI=Maudsley obsessive–compulsive inventory, PI=Padua inven-
tory-revised, BDI=Beck depression inventory, CEQ=creative experiences questionnaire. ∗p0.05; ∗∗p0.01.
Table 3
Mean TAF-scores (and standard deviations) for students (N=285), normal controls (N=20), OCD patients (N=30), and
patients with other anxiety disorders (N=41)a
Students Normal controls OCD Other anxiety
disorders
TAF-total 20.39∗ (10.53) 20.24∗ (11.41) 30.69† (14.64) 28.29† (13.07)
TAF-probability 6.25∗ (4.55) 4.23∗ (4.83) 9.42† (6.88) 8.54† (5.53)
probability self 4.16∗† (2.80) 2.64∗ (2.54) 4.88† (3.01) 4.94† (2.93)
probability others 2.10∗ (2.49) 1.60∗ (2.79) 4.54† (4.95) 3.60† (3.89)
TAF-morality 14.21∗ (8.06) 15.90∗† (9.36) 21.27† (10.15) 19.62† (9.62)
a Note: Scores not sharing the same superscript differed at the 0.05 level in one-way ANOVA (Tukey honestly
significant differences).
one factor referring to probability and the other tapping morality bias. The probability factor can
be divided into two related components, a probability self and probability others component.
Second, internal consistency of all factors as well as the total TAF-scale proved to be satisfactory.
Third, temporal stability of the TAF-scale was somewhat disappointing. Although within-subject
TAF-scores over a 3-months interval correlated significantly, mean scores seemed to have dropped
considerably. Apparently, then, TAF is unstable and susceptible to change. Perhaps, this instability
is due to the fact that the data were collected in normal participants who had scores that predomi-
nantly fell in the left portion of the TAF distribution. Thus, it might well be the case that in a
clinical sample, TAF-scores are highly stable, simply because the two types of biases indexed by
the TAF-scale have a higher prevalence in such a sample. Clearly, the temporal stability of the
TAF-scale in various clinical and non-clinical samples requires further research.
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Fourth, as to its association with widely used OCD measures (MOCI and PI-revised), it should
be noted that TAF correlated with self-reports of obsessional problems. By and large, the associ-
ation between TAF and obsessional symptoms remained significant when the contribution of
depression levels and fantasy proneness was partialled out. It is important to note that the corre-
lations found in this study pertained to a non-clinical sample. Given that Shafran et al. (1996)
found different correlational patterns in students and obsessional participants, the possibility of
generalising the current findings to obsessional populations may be limited. Finally, as expected,
TAF-scores were higher for a clinical sample than for students and normal controls. However,
OCD patients did not score significantly higher than patients suffering from other anxiety dis-
orders. This casts some doubts on the idea that TAF is a highly specific feature of OCD. Rather,
the current results support the view that TAF is a more pervasive bias that may occur in a variety
of anxiety disorders. However, this does not rule out the possibility that TAF is more implicated
in the development of OCD than it is in the aetiology of, say, panic disorder. In other words,
TAF biases might be present in both OCD and panic disorder, but the causal status of these
biases may be quite different in the two conditions. Obviously, this is an important issue for
future studies.
Like Shafran et al. (1996), we found that compared to the normal sample, our clinical sample
did not score higher on the morality subscale. Shafran et al. (1996) interpreted their failure to
find a group difference with regard to the morality scale as indicating that this bias may be more
common and less pathological than the probability bias. The current data support this interpret-
ation, while, furthermore, the probability scale seemed to correlate more strongly with the various
MOCI and PI-revised scales than did the morality scale. Also in line with Shafran et al. (1996),
we found that scores on the probability self factor did not differ between students and OCD
patients, while a significant difference was present with respect to the probability others factor.
Shafran et al. (1996) explain this pattern of results by arguing that there is a rudimental rationality
for the probability self construct, in that people might live up to their obsessive intrusion and,
thus, actually suffer the foreseen consequences (“self-fulfilling prophecy”). For example, the
intrusion “I will have a car accident” may be followed by reckless, or dangerously slow and
careful driving, increasing the risk of actually being in an accident. The probability others factor,
on the other hand, lacks such fundamental rational basis and may therefore be more exclusive to
obsessional thinking.
Rachman (1997) noted that depression may affect the interpretation of intrusive thoughts in
such a way that it leads to a pessimistic (TAF-like) explanation of intrusions. Indeed, we found
a correlation between BDI and TAF-probability. On the other hand, additional analyses revealed
that BDI-scores correlated with various MOCI and PI-revised scales (highest r=0.46, p0.01),
even after TAF-probability had been partialled out. This suggests that TAF biases do not represent
the only link between depressive mood and obsessional problems.
The correlation between TAF-probability and the CEQ supports the idea that fantasy proneness
may be implicated in several conditions. For example, earlier studies suggested that fantasy prone-
ness might be an intermediate factor in the development of dissociation (Merckelbach, Muris,
Horselenberg & Stougie, 2000) and schizotypy (Allen & Coyne, 1995). Clearly, the idea that
thoughts have predictive value (as is implied in the probability bias) is a form of magical thinking
that may have its roots in a general fantasy proneness trait. The precise linkage between obsessive
intrusions, dissociation, schizotypy, fantasy proneness, and TAF is a fruitful area for further stud-
ies.
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In sum, the present results are in line with previous findings (Shafran et al., 1996) indicating
that the TAF-scale is a reliable scale relevant to the measurement of obsessional cognitions.
However, our data about the temporal consistency of the TAF-scale show that there is room for
improvement. Also, the question of whether TAF-biases are exclusive features of OCD, or rather
pathological biases in general, needs to be addressed in more depth.
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